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Abstract
We study the testable implications of normal demand in a two-goods setting.
For a finite dataset on prices and quantities, we present the revealed preference
conditions for normality of one or both goods. Our characterization provides an
intuitive extension of the well-known Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, and is
easy to use in practice. We illustrate the empirical relevance of our theoretical results
through an application to the experimental dataset presented in Andreoni and Miller
(2002).
1 Introduction
Focusing on a two-goods setting, Chambers, Echenique, and Shmaya (2010, 2011) derived
the necessary and sufficient revealed preference conditions for behavioral complementarity
and gross substitutes in demand. The current paper complements these earlier papers by
establishing the revealed preference conditions for normal demand in situations with two
goods. As we will discuss in more detail below, our conditions bear specific relationships
to the ones of Chambers, Echenique, and Shmaya (2010, 2011).
Normal goods. A good is normal if its consumption increases with income, keeping
prices fixed. Normality is often a convenient assumption because it avoids pathological
situations that violate the law of demand, which means that a good’s consumption in-
creases with its price (i.e. Giffen goods). Normality of goods imposes restrictions on how
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demand changes when budgets (prices and income) change, which implies specific testable
implications.
For sufficiently rich data sets, normality of goods can be examined by estimating Engel
curves and, subsequently, verifying whether they have a positive slope. Typically, such a
test requires cross sectional data with fixed good prices; see, for example, Blundell, Chen,
and Kristensen (2007). A second approach looks at the theoretical restrictions on consumer
preferences that guarantee (local) normality of demand. Leroux (1987) provides a set of
sufficient conditions involving first and second order derivatives of the utility function.
Alarie and Bronsard (1990) extend these results by providing both necessary and sufficient
conditions regarding the shape of utility functions. Bilancini and Boncinelli (2010) offer
equivalent conditions that are easier to verify. Finally, Fisher (1990) relates normality of
demand to the second order derivatives of expenditure functions.
Two-goods case. Following Chambers, Echenique, and Shmaya (2010, 2011), we focus
on a demand setting with two goods and a finite set of observations on prices and demanded
quantities. If there are only two goods, a relative price increase of one good necessarily
implies a relative price decrease of the other good. As such, in two good settings relative
price changes are unambiguous. In addition, when there are only two goods, they are
necessarily Hicksian substitutes. Thus, for any price change, we can determine the direction
of the substitution effect, which will be a key factor in the characterization that we develop
below. By contrast, as soon as there are three or more goods, there may be Hicksian
complements, which makes that the substitution effect is no longer unambiguous. In such
a case, the change in the quantity of a certain good due to a relative price change will
depend on both the intensity of the complementarity or substitutability with the other
goods, as well as on the magnitude of the relative price change.
Admittedly, our focus on a two-goods setting may seem somewhat restrictive. Impor-
tantly, however, a multi-goods setting can often be reduced to a two-goods setting. First,
one can use Hicksian aggregation for dimensionality reduction. A set of goods can be
represented by a Hicksian aggregate if the goods’ relative prices remain fixed over observa-
tions. Thus, it suffices to verify the empirical validity of constant relative prices, to check
whether the demand for multiple goods can be studied in terms of two Hicksian aggregates.
Alternatively, one can assume that preferences are weakly separable. Specifically, for xi
the demanded quantity of good i and u the consumer’s utility function, we have
u(x1, . . . , xn) = v(w(x1, x2), x3, . . . , xn)),
with w representing the subutility for goods 1 and 2. In such a setting, one may consider
the demand for goods 1 and 2 separately from the demand of all other goods. Interestingly,
it is possible to empirically check this weak separability structure. See, for example, Afriat
(1969); Varian (1983); Diewert and Parkan (1985) and Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock,
and Hjertstrand (2014) for revealed preference conditions that are similar in nature to the
conditions (for normality) that we establish below.
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Our contribution. The existing tests for normality that we described above all start
from a characterization that defines conditions on underlying consumer preferences or
expenditure functions. Bringing these characterizations to data necessarily requires esti-
mating demand functions or Engel curves, to subsequently check the associated testable
implications. As such, the existing procedures always test multiple joint (explicit or im-
plicit) hypotheses regarding the functional representation of preferences/demand and the
nature of heterogeneity across different consumers.
In this paper, we follow a structurally distinct approach that is similar to the one
adopted by Chambers, Echenique, and Shmaya (2010, 2011). We derive revealed prefer-
ence conditions in the tradition of Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) that only require a finite
dataset on consumption prices and quantities. The conditions are necessary and sufficient
to guarantee the existence of rational preferences that generate the observed behavior in
terms of normal demand functions. By its very construction, our characterization avoids
any functional specification of consumer preferences, which minimizes the risk of specifica-
tion error. Our conditions are also easy to implement, which is convenient from a practical
point of view. Moreover, if multiple observations per consumer are available, they do not
require any homogeneity assumption across consumers.
Section 2 introduces our revealed preference characterization of normal goods. Section
3 discusses how our characterization relates to the revealed preference characterizations in
Chambers, Echenique, and Shmaya (2010, 2011). Section 4 contains an empirical illustra-
tion of our results that makes use of the experimental data of Andreoni and Miller (2002).
Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains the proofs of our main results.
2 Revealed preference characterization of normality
We consider a setting with two demand functions D1(p1, p2,m) and D2(p1, p2,m) : R2++ ×
R+ → R+ where p1 is the price of good 1, p2 is the price of good 2 and m is the income.
We normalize prices and income such that the price of good 2 is equal to unity. More
precisely, we define the relative price ω = p1
p2
and budget x = m
p2
, and we write D1(ω, x)
and D2(ω, x) for the two demand functions. The demand for the second good can easily
be obtained if we know D1 and the price-income pair (ω, x), i.e.
D2(ω, x) = x− ωD1(ω, x).
We restrict ourselves to demand functions that are obtained from the maximization of
a neo-classical utility function. A necessary and sufficient condition is that the demand
functions satisfy the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (Houthakker, 1950; Mas-Colell,
1978). In a two-goods setting, however, SARP is equivalent to the Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preference (WARP) (see (Rose, 1958)).
Definition 1 (WARP). A demand function D1 and associated demand function D2, satis-
fies the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) if, for any two relative prices
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ω, ω′ and incomes x, x′,
x ≥ ωD1(ω′, x′) +D2(ω′, x′) and x′ ≥ ω′D1(ω, x) +D2(ω, x)
implies D1(ω, x) = D1(ω
′, x′) and D2(ω, x) = D2(ω′, x′).
In reality, we do not observe the demand functions but only a dataset S = {pt,qt}t=1,...,T ,
which consists of a finite number of prices pt = (pt,1, pt,2) and chosen quantities qt =
(qt,1, qt,2). By defining ωt =
pt,1
pt,2
and xt = ωtqt,1 + qt,2, we can also specify the dataset
S = {ωt, qt,1, xt}t=1,...,T . By construction qt,2 can be recovered as
qt,2 = xt − ωtqt,1.
As shown by Varian (1982), it suffices to check WARP for this finite dataset S in order
to guarantee the existence of a well-behaved utility function (and corresponding demand
functions satisfying WARP). In what follows, we first consider the setting with one normal
good. Subsequently, we characterize normality of both goods.
A single normal good. We say that the demand for good 1 is normal if it is increasing
in x. More formally, we use the following definition.
Definition 2. The demand function D1 is (strongly) normal if for all ω and for all
x < x′, D1(ω, x) < D1(ω, x′), i.e. an increase in income raises the demand for the good.
The demand function is weakly normal if for all ω and all x ≤ x′, D1(ω, x) ≤ D1(ω, x′).
The next definition states our key rationality axiom.
Definition 3 (NARP). A dataset S = {ωt, qt,1, xt}t=1,...T satisfies the Normality Axiom
of Revealed Preference (NARP) if, for all observations t, v ∈ {1, . . . T}:
if ωt ≤ ωv and xt ≥ ωtqv,1 + qv,2 then qv,1 ≤ qt,1, and (NARP-I)
if ωt ≤ ωv and xt > ωtqv,1 + qv,2 then qv,1 < qt,1. (NARP-II)
The condition (NARP-II) is the strict variant of (NARP-I). If we focus on weak normal-
ity, we can omit (NARP-II). For compactness, we will mainly consider the strong version
of normality in our following exposition. However, it is fairly straightforward to extend our
discussion (including the proofs of our main results) to include the weak normality case.
The first part of the NARP condition in Definition 3 requires that the relative price of
good 1 in observation t is lower than the relative price of good 1 in observation v. This
guarantees that the substitution effect from observation v to observation t for good 1 is
positive. The second part requires that qt is revealed preferred to qv. This guarantees a
positive income effect. If both these conditions hold, then the consumption of good 1 in
period v (i.e. qv,1) should be lower than the consumption of good 1 in period t (i.e. qt,1),
as both price and income effect are positive.
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Figure 1: A violation of NARP
good 2
good 1
q1
q2
Figure 1 illustrates a case where NARP is violated. As a first observation, we note that
the budget lines do not cross, so these observations are consistent with WARP. However,
it is impossible that good 1 is a normal good. In order to see this, let us decompose the
change of budget 1 towards budget 2 in a price and income effect. Consider the shift from
the first budget to the dashed budget. This represents the minimal budget that can still
afford the bundle q1 at the new prices. The new prices imply a relative price decrease of
good 1. As the own price effect is negative, the optimal bundle at the dashed budget line
should contain more of good 1 (and less of good 2) compared to q1. Second, the shift from
the dashed budget line to the second budget line is a pure income effect. As such, if good
1 is normal, this implies that, again, the demand for good 1 should increase. The total
effect is the sum of the two, which means that q2 should contain more of good 1 than q1.
However, this last requirement is violated for the example shown in Figure 1, and thus we
conclude that NARP is rejected (i.e. good 1 cannot be a normal good).
While the above shows that NARP is an intuitive necessary condition, the following
theorem states that NARP is also the only condition that we need to impose on observed
choices to characterize normality of good 1. If a finite dataset satisfies NARP, then we
can find a utility function that rationalizes the observations in the dataset such that the
associated demand function for good 1 is normal.
Theorem 1. Consider a dataset S = {ωt, qt,1, xt}t=1,...,T where for all t, v ∈ {1, . . . T},
(ωt, xt) 6= (ωv, xv) and qt,1 > 0. This dataset satisfies NARP if and only if there exist
continuous and WARP consistent demand functions D1 and D2 where D1 is normal and
where, for all t ∈ {1, . . . T}, D1(ωt, xt) = qt,1 and D2(ωt, xt) = qt,2 = xt − ωtqt,1.
Normality of both goods. In some settings, it might be interesting to require that
both goods are normal. In order to analyze this situation, we take a different approach.
In particular, we will exploit the fact that in a two-goods setting with both goods normal,
the income expansion paths are strictly increasing functions. To be more precise, if both
goods are (strongly) normal, i.e. D1(ω, x) and D2(ω, x) are strictly increasing in x, it is
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possible to invert the function D1(ω, x) with respect to x, say x = ξ(ω,D1), and substitute
the inverted function into D2(ω, x). This gives us a function ψ(ω,D1) = D2(ω, ξ(ω,D1))
that determines the optimal choice of good 2 given that D1 is the optimal choice of good 1,
for ω the relative price of good 1 compared to good 2. In other words, it gives the equation
of the income expansion path, which is a strictly increasing function. The following result
characterizes WARP and normality in terms of the expansion paths.
Lemma 1. Both goods are normal if and only if the income expansion path ψ(ω,D1) is an
increasing function of D1 with ψ(ω, 0) = 0.
In addition, if both goods are normal then the demand functions satisfy WARP if and
only if the income expansion path ψ(ω,D1) is weakly increasing in ω (i.e. ω
′ ≥ ω implies
ψ(ω′, D1) ≥ ψ(ω,D1)).
In this case, we can define our key rationality axiom as follows.
Definition 4 (JNARP). A datasetS = {ωt, qt,1, xt}t=1,...,T satisfies the Joint Normality
Axiom of Revealed preference (JNARP) if, for all t, v ∈ {1, . . . T},
if ωt ≤ ωv and qt,1 ≤ qv,1 then qt,2 ≤ qv,2, and (JNARP-I)
if ωt ≤ ωv and qt,1 < qv,1 then qt,2 < qv,2. (JNARP-II)
As before, JNARP should be relaxed if we focus on weak normality. Then, (JNARP-II)
can be ignored and (JNARP-I) must only hold for situations with qt,1 < qv,1.
The intuition of JNARP is the following. By Lemma 1, we know that the income
expansion path is increasing in both ω and D1. As such, if both arguments increase when
going from observation t to observation v, then the quantity of the second good should
also increase.
The following lemma specifies an intuitive connection between our two revealed prefer-
ence axioms.
Lemma 2. A dataset S = {ωt, qt,1, xt}t=1,...,T satisfies JNARP if and only if it satisfies
NARP for both goods.
The next theorem states that JNARP characterizes normality in both goods.
Theorem 2. Consider a dataset S = {ωt, qt,1, xt}t=1,...,T where for all t, v ∈ {1, . . . T},
(ωt, xt) 6= (ωv, xv) and qt,1 > 0. This dataset satisfies JNARP if and only if there exist
continuous and WARP consistent demand functions D1 and D2 where D1 and D2 are both
normal and where, for all t ∈ {1, . . . T}, ψ (ωt, qt,1) = qt,2.
3 Behavioral complementarity and gross substitutes
We start by formally showing that consistency with the revealed preference conditions
for complementarity implies consistency with weak JNARP. However, the opposite does
not hold, which shows that complementarity is only a sufficient (but not a necessary)
condition for normality. Next, we construct two example datasets to show that the revealed
preference conditions for gross substitutes are independent of those for JNARP.
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Behavioral complementarity. Two goods are behavioral complements if a price in-
crease in one good leads to a decrease in the consumption of the other good. If D1(p1, p2,m)
is differentiable, then complementarity is equivalent to the assumption that
∂D1(p1, p2,m)
∂p2
≤ 0.
This cross-price derivative can be decomposed in terms of a substitution and income effect,
i.e.
∂D1(p1, p2,m)
∂p2
=
∂Dc1
∂p2
− ∂D1(p1, p2,m)
∂m
D2 ≤ 0,
where Dc1 is the Slutsky compensated demand function that keeps income fixed at m =
p1D1 + p2D2, i.e. D
c
1 = D1(p1, p2, p1D1 + p2D2). The first term at the right hand side
of the above expression determines how the compensated demand for good 1 changes as
p2 increases. In a two-goods setting, this effect is always positive, as goods are Hicksian
substitutes by construction. The second term captures an income effect. This term will be
negative if D1 is a normal good and positive if D1 is inferior. In order for the two goods
to be complements, it is therefore necessary that good 1 is normal. However, there is a
lower bound on the amount of normality that needs to be imposed. Thus, we conclude
that complementarity is a stronger condition than normality.
Chambers, Echenique, and Shmaya (2010) state the revealed preference conditions for
complementary goods. To formally relate these conditions to ours, we need to renor-
malize prices and income such that the total expenditure is equal to one. Consider a
dataset S = {pt,qt}t=1,...,T such that ptqt = 1 for all t. For any t, v, we let pt ∧ pv =
(min{pt,1, pv,1},min{pt,2, pv,2}) and qt ∨ qv = (max{qt,1, qt,2},max{qt,2, qv,2}). The re-
vealed preference conditions of Chambers, Echenique, and Shmaya (2010) require, for all
t, v ∈ {1, . . . , T},
1. (pt ∧ pv)(qt ∨ qv) ≤ 1;
2. if ptqv ≤ 1 and pt,i > pv,i for some i = {1, 2}, then qt,j ≥ qv,j for j 6= i.
These conditions characterize consistency with weak complementarity. Their formal rela-
tion to our weak version of JNARP is stated in the next result.
Lemma 3. If a dataset S = {pt,qt}t=1,...,T satisfies Chambers, Echenique, and Shmaya
(2010)’s conditions for weak complementarity, then it also satisfies the weak version of
JNARP.
Importantly, the converse of the lemma does not hold true. We illustrate this in Fig-
ure 2. The figure depicts a situation for which the inequality 1 ≥ (p1 ∧ p2)(q1 ∨ q2) is
violated, i.e. the bundle (q1 ∨ q2) is above the dashed budget line. As an implication,
complementarity is not satisfied. However, the dataset does satisfy JNARP as q1 is not
revealed preferred over q2 and q2 is not revealed preferred over q1.
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Figure 2: A violation of complementarity but not of JNARP
good 2
good 1
q1
q2
q1 ∨ q2
Gross substitutes. Two goods are gross substitutes if the price increase of one good
leads to an increase in the consumption of the other good. For a differentiable demand
function, this implies
∂D1(p1, p2,m)
∂p2
≥ 0.
Again decomposing this into a substitution and income effect, we have
∂D1(p1, p2,m)
∂p2
=
∂Dc1
∂p2
− ∂D1(p1, p2,m)
∂m
D2 ≥ 0.
Like before, the first term on the right hand side is positive because we consider a two-
goods setting. The second term can be both positive or negative (although its magnitude
will be limited). In other words, gross substitutes can in principle be consistent with both
normal and inferior goods.
Chambers et al. (2011) derive the revealed preference conditions for two goods to be
gross substitutes. These conditions require, for all t, v ∈ t = 1, . . . , T ,
if pt,1 ≤ pv,1 and pt,2 ≥ pv,2, then pv,1qv,1 ≤ pt,1qt,1.
The following two examples show that these conditions are independent of our (J)NARP
conditions that we stated above. Example 1 gives a dataset that satisfies JNARP but not
gross substitutability, while the opposite applies to the dataset in Example 2.
Example 1. pt = (1, 3), pv = (3, 1), qt = (1/3, 2/9), qv = (2/9, 1/3). Observe that
ptqt = 1 ≤ ptqv = 2/9 + 1,
pvqv = 1 ≤ pvqt = 1 + 2/9.
As such, no bundle is revealed preferred to the other one, which implies that JNARP is
satisfied. On the other hand, pt,1 ≤ pv,1 and pt,2 ≥ pv,2, while pv,1qv,1 = 2/3 > pt,1qt,1 = 1/3.
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This shows that Chambers, Echenique, and Shmaya (2011)’s conditions for gross substi-
tutability is not met.
Example 2. pt = (1, 2), pv = (4, 3), qt = (1/5, 2/5), qv = (1/4, 1/4). Then ωt ≤ ωv and
ptqt = 1 > ptqv = 3/4. This implies a violation of NARP, and thus also JNARP, since
qt,1 = 1/5 < qv,1 = 1/4. On the other hand, pt,1 ≤ pv,1 and pt,2 ≤ pv,2, so the conditions of
Chambers et al. (2011) are automatically satisfied.
4 Empirical illustration
We next illustrate the usefulness of our theoretical results by applying them to the experi-
mental dataset of Andreoni and Miller (2002). The experiment was designed to investigate
individual preferences for giving by exposing subjects to a series of dictator games under
varying incomes and conversion rates between giving and keeping. In particular, subjects
made several choices by filling in questions of the form: “Divide X tokens: Hold at
a points, and Pass at b points (the Hold and Pass amounts must sum to X)”. The
parameters X, a and b were varied across the decision problems and all points were worth
$0.10. Andreoni and Miller (2002) considered two groups of experimental subjects. The
first group of 134 subjects (Group 1) solved 8 dictatorship games (i.e. T = 8), while the
second group of 34 subjects (Group 2) solved an additional 3 games (i.e. T = 11)
Table 1: Pass rates and power for (strong) normality and WARP
NARP NARP JNARP WARP
giving keeping
Group 1 Pass rate 0.6923 0.2168 0.1958 0.9091
Power 0.980 0.986 0.999 0.743
Group 2 Pass rate 0.5882 0.0882 0.0588 0.8529
Power 0.999 0.997 1 0.94
Our revealed preference characterizations allow us to determine whether ‘giving’ or
‘keeping’ are normal goods: is it the case that one gives more money or keeps more money
if total available funds increase? Table 1 presents the pass rates for the revealed preference
conditions of both (strong) normality and WARP.
We see that a large majority of the subjects satisfies WARP, which means that they
made choices that are consistent with utility maximization. More than half of the subjects
are consistent with the NARP condition for giving. In other words, for more than 50% of
the sample we cannot reject that giving is a normal good. The NARP condition for keeping
has a much lower pass rate: around 22% for Group 1 and below 10% for Group 2. This
seems to indicate that keeping is not a normal good for most individuals. The JNARP
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Table 2: Pass rates and power for weak normality, complementarity and gross substitutes
weak NARP weak NARP weak JNARP Complements Substitutes
giving keeping
Group 1 Pass rate 0.8462 0.6713 0.6573 0.3916 0.3986
Power 0.970 0.971 0.999 1 0.999
Group 2 Pass rate 0.8235 0.6176 0.6176 0.3235 0.5294
Power 0.94 0.998 1 1 1
condition (which requires that both keeping and giving are normal) is only satisfied for
approximately 20% of the subjects in Group 1 and 6% of the subjects in Group 2. It is also
interesting to notice that the decrease in pass rates from WARP to NARP (or JNARP)
is rather significant. This seems to indicate that normality of goods has strong testable
restrictions in addition to WARP. Putting it differently, normality is not necessarily a weak
and innocuous assumption.
The differences between the pass rates reported in Table 1 may be partly explained by
varying empirical bite of the different testable implications under study. Indeed, NARP
and JNARP verify consistency with both rationality and normality, whereas WARP only
requires rationality. To examine this further, we quantify the discriminatory power of the
behavioral models under evaluation. We define power as the probability of detecting irra-
tional behavior. Following Bronars (1987), we simulate irrational behavior by randomly
drawing quantity bundles from the budget lines corresponding to the different observed
price regimes. Given the particular set-up of the experiment of Andreoni and Miller (2002),
this generates random data sets with respectively 8 and 11 observations. For these newly
constructed sets, we can check consistency with the revealed preference conditions of the
different behavioral models. We iterated this procedure 1000 times, and our power mea-
sure for a given model then equals the fraction of violations of the corresponding testable
restrictions. The results of this exercise are also given in Table 1. For all four models we
find that the power is very high, which indicates that the conclusions for our experimental
dataset are empirically meaningful. Nonetheless, for Group 1 we learn that part of the
difference between the pass rates of WARP and the other models may be due to a drop in
empirical bite. This is, however, not the case for Group 2.
Finally, Table 2 presents pass rates and power results for the axioms that test for
weak normality, complementarity and gross substitutes. More than 80% of the subjects
satisfy the test for weak normality for giving, and for more than 60% of the subjects we
cannot reject the assumption that keeping is a normal good. The hypothesis that both
goods are jointly normal is not rejected for more than 60% of the sample. This suggests
that weak normality has more empirical support than normality, at least for the sample
under consideration. Of course, we should also note that the conditions for weak normality
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are also weaker by construction, which implies that the associated pass rates can never be
lower. Further, we observe that the pass rates for complementarity and gross substitutes are
substantially lower than the ones for normality. In our opinion, this clearly demonstrates
that our results in Section 3 on non-nestedness of the behavioral hypotheses are not merely
theoretical curiosities; they also have empirical relevance. Importantly, it appears that we
cannot simply attribute the differences in pass rates in Table 2 to differences in empirical
bite, as the power is close to one for all models under consideration.
5 Conclusion
We have derived revealed preference conditions in a two-goods setting that guarantee the
existence of a utility function that rationalizes the data and generates demand functions
with (one or two) normal goods. Our conditions are easy to implement and significantly
strengthen the well-established Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) in empirical
applications. We have also clarified the relation between our characterization of normal
demand and Chambers, Echenique, and Shmaya (2010, 2011)’s characterizations of behav-
ioral complementarities and gross substitutes.
We see different avenues for further research. A first natural follow-up question is to
extend our results to settings with more than two goods (for which Hicksian aggregation
and weak separability do not hold). However, tackling this issue will require an entirely
new approach, as our results in the present paper crucially rely on the fact that goods are
always Hicksian substitutes in a two-goods setting. Next, another interesting question that
is directly related to the current paper pertains to checking the necessary versus luxury
nature of goods or, more generally, to developing testable implications associated with
alternative assumptions regarding goods’ income elasticities. For a two-goods setting, this
research may build further on the findings that we developed in this paper.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem1
Proof. Necessity. Assume that the observed demands are part of a rational demand
system (D1, D2) where D1 is normal and assume that
ωt ≤ ωv and xt ≥ (>)ωtqv,1 + qv,2.
Consider the income demanded at relative prices ωt that can still buy the bundle qv, i.e.
x˜ = ωtqv,1 + qv,2 ≤ (<)xt.
Denote
D˜1 = D1(ωt, x˜),
D˜2 = D2(ωt, x˜).
By definition, we have that
ωtD˜1 + D˜2 = x˜ = ωtqv,1 + qv,2.
Given that the demand functions are rational, we must have that (by WARP)
xv < ωvD˜1 + D˜2,
or D˜1 = qv,1 and D˜2 = qv,2. If the first is the case, then
ωt(D˜1 − qv,1) + (D˜2 − qv,2) = 0,
ωv(D˜1 − qv,1) + (D˜2 − qv,2) > 0.
Taking the difference gives
(ωt − ωv) (D˜1 − qv,1) < 0.
Given that the first term is non-positive, we must have that D˜1 > qv,1 (what we have shown
here is that the income compensated price effect of good 1 is negative). We conclude that
WARP implies D˜1 ≥ qv,1 in both cases.
The change from (ωt, x˜) to (ωt, xt) corresponds to a pure income increase, which is
(strictly) positive if xt(>) ≥ x˜ = ωtqv,1 + qv,2, so if D1 is normal, we should have that
qv,1 ≤ D˜1 ≤ (<)qt,1,
as was to be shown.
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Sufficiency. For the reverse, we will construct continuous demand functions D1, D2 that
satisfy the following condition:
Condition I For two relative price income situations (ω, x) and (ω′, x′),
if ω ≤ ω′ and x ≥ (>)ωD1(ω′, x′) +D2(ω′, x′),
then D1(ω
′, x′) ≤ (<)D1(ω, x).
Let us first show that any system of demand functions that satisfy Condition I satisfies
both WARP and normality of D1. For WARP, assume that
x ≥ ωD1(ω′, x′) +D2(ω′, x′) and x′ ≥ ω′D1(ω, x) +D2(ω, x).
This gives
ω(D1(ω, x)−D1(ω′, x′)) +D2(ω, x)−D2(ω′, x′) ≥ 0,
ω′(D1(ω′, x′)−D1(ω, x)) +D2(ω′, x′)−D2(ω, x) ≥ 0.
If ω = ω′ then both inequalities are in fact equalities. However, given condition I, this can
only happen if (D1(ω, x), D2(ω, x)) = (D1(ω
′, x′), D2(ω′, x′)) which shows consistency with
WARP. So assume that ω 6= ω′. Taking the sum gives
(ω − ω′) (D1(ω, x)−D1(ω′, x′)) ≥ 0. (1)
If ω < ω′, then Condition I states that D1(ω′, x′) ≤ D1(ω, x). If D1(ω′, x′) < D1(ω, x)
equation (1) is violated. On the other hand, if D1(ω
′, x′) = D1(ω, x) we also obtain that
D2(ω, x) = D2(ω
′, x′), which established WARP. If ω > ω′, then reversing the roles of ω and
ω′ in Condition I gives that D1(ω, x) ≤ D1(ω′, x′). If D1(ω, x) < D1(ω′, x′) then inequality
(1) is again violated. If D1(ω, x) = D1(ω
′, x′), we also obtain that D2(ω, x) = D2(ω, x′) so
WARP is satisfied.
To show that D1 is normal if Condition I is satisfied, take ω = ω
′ and x ≥ (>)x′, so
Condition I requires that D1(ω, x) ≥ (>)D1(ω′, x′) which shows normality.
Now let us prove that such functions exist. Towards this end, we first rewrite the second
statement of Condition I in the following form.
x ≥ ωD1(ω′, x′) +D2(ω′, x′) = ωD1(ω′, x′) + x′ − ω′D1(ω′, x′)
⇐⇒ x ≥ x′ + (ω − ω′)D1(ω′, x′)
⇐⇒ x′ ≤ x+ (ω′ − ω)D1(ω′, x′).
For every t, v let δt,v = min{|ωt − ωv| , |xt − xv + (ωt − ωv)qt,1|} if ωt 6= ωv and xt−xv+
(ωt − ωv)qt,1 6= 0. Else let δt,v = max{|ωt − ωv| , |xt − xv + (ωt − ωv)qt,1|}. Observe that
δt,v > 0 otherwise we would have that ωt = ωv and xt = xv, which we excluded. Consider
a number ε > 0 such that
min
t,v,t6=v
δt,v > ε.
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Define α, β > 0 such that
1 + β < min
t,v
{
qv,1
qt,1
∣∣∣∣qv,1 > qt,1} ,
α(1 + β) < min
t,v
{
qv,1
qt,1
}
.
Consider the function g : R→ R+ such that
g(z) =

α for z ≤ −ε,
1 + 1−α
ε
z for − ε ≤ z ≤ 0,
1 for z ≥ 0.
This is a continuous and increasing function (see figure below).
z
g(z)
α
1
−ε
In addition, consider the function
h(z) =

α 1|z+ε−1| for z ≤ −ε,
1 + 1−α
ε
z for − ε ≤ z ≤ 0,
1 + β z
z+1
for z ≥ 0.
This is a continuous and strictly increasing function (see figure below).
z
h(z)
α
1
1 + β
−ε
For any (ω, x) ∈ R2++, consider the following maximization program,
Program I
D1(ω, x) = max
r
r
s.t. g (ω − ωt) h (xt + (ω − ωt)r − x) r ≤ qt,1, ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T}
ωr ≤ x.
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First, observe that, as g(.) and h(.) are non-negative, r = 0 is always a feasible solution.
This shows that D1(ω, x) is non-negative. Next, observe that as x → 0, D1(ω, x) → 0, so
the demand function is well defined. The following lemma shows that this demand function
equal the observed data points.
Lemma 4. For all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}: D1(ωt, xt) = qt,1.
Proof. First of all, notice that for ω = ωt and x = xt, r = qt,1 satisfies the last constraint
of Program I. Also, the t-th constraint of Program I gives
g (ωt − ωt) h (xt + (ωt − ωt)r − xt) r ≤ qt,1
↔g (0) h (0) r = r ≤ qt,1.
As such, qt,1 is an upper bound for D1(ωt, xt). We are left to show that r = qt,1 also satisfies
all other constraints. We consider several cases.
Case I: ωt < ωv In this case, we have, by assumption ωt − ωv < −ε. As such,
g (ωt − ωv) h (xv + (ωt − ωv)qt,1 − xt) qt,1 ≤ α(1 + β)qt,1 ≤ qv,1.
Case II: ωt ≥ ωv and xv + (ωt − ωv)qt,1 − xt > 0 In this case, NARP gives us that
qt,1 < qv,1. As such,
g (ωt − ωv) h (xv + (ωt − ωv)qt,1 − xt) qt,1 ≤ (1 + β)qt,1 ≤ qv,1.
Case III: ωt ≥ ωv and xv + (ωt − ωv)qt,1 − xt = 0 In this case, NARP tells us that
qt,1 ≤ qv,1. As such,
g (ωt − ωv) h (xv + (ωt − ωv)qt,1 − xt) qt,1 = qt,1 ≤ qv,1.
Case IV: ωt ≥ ωv and xv + (ωt − ωv)qt,1 − xt < 0 Then, by assumption, we have that
xv + (ωt − ωv)qt,1 − xt < −ε. As such,
g (ωt − ωv) h (xv + (ωt − ωv)qt,1 − xt) qt,1 ≤ αqt,1 ≤ qv,1.
As such we obtain that D1(ωt, xt) = qt,1.
Now, consider two price-income vectors (ω, x) and (ω′, x′) and the associated solutions
D1(ω, x) and D1(ω
′, x′) of Program I. We need to show that Condition I is satisfied. In
particular, if
ω ≤ ω′ and, (2)
x′ ≤ (<)x+ (ω′ − ω) D1(ω′, x′) (3)
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then D1(ω
′, x′) ≤ (<)D1(ω, x). The way to proceed is by showing that if (2) and (3) are
satisfied, then D1(ω
′, x′) was also feasible solution for Program I at price-income (ω, x),
i.e. D1(ω
′, x′) satisfies the following restrictions:
g (ω − ωt) h (xt + (ω − ωt)D1(ω′, x′)− xt))D1(ω′, x′) ≤ qt,1 ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, (4)
ωD1(ω
′, x′) ≤ x. (5)
Condition (3) can be rewritten as x ≥ (>)ωD1(ω′, x′) + (x′− ω′D1(ω′, x′) ≥ ωD1(ω′, x′) so
we know that D1(ω
′, x′) satisfies (5). The function g is non-decreasing. As such, using (2),
g (ω − ωt) ≤ g (ω′ − ωt) .
Likewise, h(.) is strictly increasing, so from (3),
h (xt + (ω − ωt)D1(ω′, x′)− x)
≤ (<)h (xt + (ω − ωt)D1(ω′, x′) + (ω′ − ω)D1(ω′, x′)− x′))
=h (xt + (ω
′ − ωt)D1(ω′, x′)− x′) .
Given this, we have that, for all t,
g (ω − ωt) h (xt + (ω − ωt)D1(ω′, x′)− x)D1(ω′, x′)
≤ (<)g (ω′ − ωt) h (xt + (ω′ − ωt)D1(ω′, x′)− x′)D1(ω′, x′) ≤ q1,t,
which shows that (4) is also satisfied. Given that D(ω′, x′) is feasible for the maximization
Program I at price-income (ω, x), we must have that D1(ω
′, x′) ≤ D1(ω, x). In addition, if
the inequality (3) is strict, we can find a strictly better solution as all inequalities become
slack and we can always find a strictly higher optimal value that satisfied all inequalities.
As such, D1(ω
′, x′) < D1(ω, x) as was to be shown. Given that the constraint set of
Program I is compact and continuous in (ω, x), we have, by Berge’s maximum theorem,
that the optimal value function is also continuous in (ω, x). In other words, D1(ω, x) is a
continuous function.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The first part of the proof is easy. For the second part, assume, towards a con-
tradiction that ω ≤ ω′ and ψ(ω,D1) > ψ(ω′, D1) for some value D1 > 0 and WARP is
satisfied. Then we have that ωD1 + ψ(ω,D1) > ωD1 + ψ(ω
′, D1)).
Given that the left hand side of this equation is strictly decreasing in D1, there should
exist a value q1 < D1 such that,
ωq1 + ψ(ω, q1) = ωD1 + ψ(ω
′, D1).
But then,
ω′D1 + ψ(ω′, D1) = ω′D1 + ωq1 + ψ(ω, q1)− ωD1
= (ω′ − ω)D1 + ωq1 + ψ(ω, q1)
≥ (ω′ − ω)q1 + ωq1 + ψ(ω, q1)
= ω′q1 + ψ(ω, q1).
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Given this, WARP implies that q1 = D1 (and ψ(ω, q1) = ψ(ω
′, D1)), a contradiction.
Conversely, if WARP is violated then there are relative prices ω, ω′ and quantities
(q1, ψ(ω, q1)) 6= (q′1, ψ(ω′, q′1)) such that,
ωq1 + ψ(ω, q1) ≥ ωq′1 + ψ(ω′, q′1),
ω′q′1 + ψ(ω
′, q′1) ≥ ω′q1 + ψ(ω, q1).
This gives,
ω(q1 − q′1) + ψ(ω, q1)− ψ(ω′, q′1) ≥ 0,
ω′(q′1 − q1) + ψ(ω′, q′1)− ψ(ω, q1) ≥ 0.
If ω = ω′, then ψ(ω, q1) = ψ(ω′, q′1) and consequentially, q1 = q
′
1, a contradiction. Also, if
q1 = q
′
1 we have that ψ(ω, q1) = ψ(ω
′, q′1), again a contradiction. As such, we can assume
that ω 6= ω′ and q1 6= q′1. Adding up the two inequalities gives,
(ω − ω′)(q1 − q′1) ≥ 0.
Assume wlog that ω′ < ω then we have that q′1 < q1. Then,
ω′q′1 + ψ(ω
′, q′1) ≥ ω′q1 + ψ(ω, q1) > ω′q′1 + ψ(ω, q′1).
This gives that ψ(ω′, q′1) > ψ(ω, q
′
1) which shows that ψ(ω, q1) is not (weakly) increasing
in ω.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Assume that NARP is satisfied for both goods. Then if JNARP is violated there
are observations t, v such that ωt ≤ ωv, qt,1 ≤ (<)qv,1 and qt,2 > (≥)qv,2. Then negating
NARP gives
xt ≤ (<)ωtqv,1 + qv,2,
xv < (≤)ωvqt,1 + qt,2
or, equivalently,
ωt(qt,1 − qv,1) + qt,2 − qv,2 ≤ (<)0,
ωv(qv,1 − qt,1) + qv,2 − qt,2 < (≤)0.
Adding up gives
(ωt − ωv)(qt,1 − qv,1) < 0.
The first factor is non-positive. As such, it must be that qt,1 > qt,2, a contradiction.
18
For the reverse; Assume that JNARP is satisfied and assume that, towards a contra-
diction, ωt ≤ ωv, xt ≥ (>)ωtqv,1 + qv,2 and qt,1 < (≤)qv,1. By JNARP, we must conclude
that qt,2 < (≤)qv,2. As such,
xt ≥ (>)ωtqv,1 + qv,2 > (≥)ωtqt,1 + qt,2 = xt,
which is a contradiction. A violation for good 2 of NARP gives ωt ≤ ωv, xv ≥ (>)ωvqt,1+qt,2
and qv,2 < (≤)qt,2. Negating JNARP implies that qt,1 > (≥)qv,1. As such,
xv ≥ (>)ωvqt,1 + qt,2 > (≥)ωvqv,1 + qv,2 = xv,
a contradiction.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Necessity. Assume that ωt ≤ ωv. and qt,1 ≤ (<)qv,1. Given Lemma 1, we have
that that ψ(ω, q1) is weakly increasing in ω and strictly increasing in q1, which obtains
qt,2 = ψ(ωt, qt,1) ≤ ψ(ωv, qt,1) ≤ (<)ψ(ωv, qv,1) = qv,2,
as was to be shown.
Sufficiency. We start by showing the following result.
Lemma 5. If S = {ωt, qt,1, xt}t=1,...,T where (ωt, xt) 6= (ωv, xv) for all t, v ∈ {1, . . . , T}
satisfies JNARP, then for all t, v ∈ {1, . . . , T} it is not the case that ωt = ωv and q1,t = q1,v.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that ωt = ωv and qt,1 = qv,1. Then because of
JNARP, it follows that qt,2 = qv,2. However, this implies that xt = ωtqt,1 + qt,2 = ωvqv,1 +
qv,2 = xv, which contradicts the assumption that (ωt, xt) 6= (ωv, xv).
The construction of ψ(ω, x) is similar as the construction of D1(ω, x) in the proof of
Theorem 1. For any t, v, let δt,v = min{|ωt − ωv| , |q1,t − q1,v|} if ωt 6= ωv and q1,t 6= q1,v,
and set δt,v = max{|ωt − ωv| , |q1,t − q1,v|} otherwise. The lemma above guarantees that
δt,v > 0 for all t, v. Next, consider a number ε > 0 such that
min
t,v,t 6=v
δt,v > ε.
Define α, β > 0 such that
1 + β < min
t,v
{
qv,2
qt,2
∣∣∣∣qv,2 > qt,2} ,
α(1 + β) < min
t,v
{
qv,2
qt,2
}
.
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As in the proof of theorem 1, consider the functions g : R→ R++ and h : R→ R++,
g(z) =

α for z ≤ −ε,
1 + 1−α
ε
z for − ε ≤ z ≤ 0,
1 for z ≥ 0.
h(z) =

α 1|z+ε−1| for z ≤ −ε,
1 + 1−α
ε
z for − ε ≤ z ≤ 0,
1 + β z
z+1
for z ≥ 0.
Let q be such that 0 < q1 < mint{qt,1}. For any (ω, q1) ∈ R++ × [q,∞[, consider the
following maximization program
Program II
ψ(ω, q1) = max r
g (ωt − ω) h (qt,1 − q1) r ≤ qt,2.
Observe that 0 is a feasible solution where all inequalities are slack, so ψ(ω, q1) > 0. We
extend the function ψ(ω, q) on the entire domain R++ × R by defining for 0 < q1 < q1,
ψ(ω, q1) =
(
q1
/
q1
)
ψ(ω, q1). This makes sure that ψ(ω, 0) = 0.
Lemma 6. For all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}: ψ(ωt, qt,1) = qt,2.
Proof. First of all, notice that the t-th restriction gives
g(ωt − ωt) h(qt,1 − qt,1)w = w ≤ qt,2.
as such, qt,2 is an upper bound on ψ(ωt, qt,1). As such, we only need to show that qt,2 also
satisfies all other restrictions. There are several cases to consider.
Case I: ωv < ωt In this case, we have that ωv − ωt ≤ −ε, so,
g(ωv − ωt) h(qv1 − qt,1)qt,2 ≤ α(1 + β)qt,1 ≤ qv,2.
Case II: ωv ≥ ωt and qt,1 < qv,1 In this case JNARP gives qt,2 < qv,2, so
g(ωv − ωt) h(qv1 − qt,1)qt,2 ≤ 1(1 + β)qt,2 ≤ qv,2.
Case III: ωv ≥ ωt and qt,1 = qv,1 In this case JNARP gives qt,2 ≤ qv,2, so
g(ωv − ωt) h(qv1 − qt,1)qt,2 = qt,2 ≤ qv,2.
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Case IV: ωv ≥ ωt and qt,1 > qv,1 Then we know that qv,1 − qt,1 < −ε, so
g(ωv − ωt) h(qv1 − qt,1)qt,2 ≤ αqt,2 ≤ qv,2.
In all four cases this gives us the desired contradiction.
We finish the proof by showing that ψ(ω, q1) is increasing in ω and strictly increasing
in q1. First consider the case where q1 ≥ q1. Let ω ≤ ω′. Observe that
g(ωt − ω′)h(qt,1 − q1)ψ(ω, q1) ≤ g(ωt − ω)h(qt,1 − q1)ψ(ω, q1) ≤ qt,2.
As such, the solution ψ(ω, q1) is also a feasible solution for the problem that determines
ψ(ω′, q1). Given this, we know that ψ(ω, q1) ≤ ψ(ω′, q1). Second if q1 ≤ (<)q′1 then, as
g(.) > 0 and h(.) is strictly increasing,
g(ωt − ω)h(qt,1 − q′1)ψ(ω, q1) ≤ (<)g(ωt − ω)h(qt,1 − q′1)ψ(ω, q1) ≤ qt,2.
As such, the solution ψ(ω, q1) is also feasible for the problem that determines ψ(ω, q
′
1),
demonstrating that ψ(ω, q1) ≤ ψ(ω, q′1). If q1 < q′1 all inequalities become slack. As such,
in this case, we have ψ(ω, q1) < ψ(ω, q
′
1).
For q1 < q1, ψ(ω, q1) is weakly increasing in ω as ψ(ω, q1) is weakly increasing in ω. If
q1 < q1 ≤ q′1, then ψ(ω, q1) < ψ(ω, q1) ≤ ψ(ω, q′1). Finally, if q1 < q′1 < q1, then
ψ(ω, q1) =
q1
q1
ψ(ω, q1)
<
q′1
q1
ψ(ω, q1)
= ψ(ω, q′1).
We can thus conclude that ψ(ω, q1) is strictly increasing in q1, as was to be shown.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Assume, towards a contradiction, that the conditions of Chambers, Echenique, and
Shmaya (2010) are satisfied but the weak version of JNARP is not satisfied. We consider
two cases.
Case I: pt,1
pt,2
≤ pv,1
pv,2
, 1 ≥ ptqv and qt,1 < qv,1.
Observe that the premises implies that either pt,1 ≤ pv,1 or pt,2 ≥ pv,2.
If pt,2 > pv,2, then by the second condition, we have that qt,1 ≥ qv,1, a contradiction.
As such, it must be that pt,2 ≤ pv,2.
If pt,2 = pv,2, then by assumption, it must be that pt,1 6= pv,1. If pt,1 > pv,1, then
1 ≥ ptqv > pvqv = 1,
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a contradiction.
If pt,1 < pv,1, we have that pt ∧ pv = pt but then,
1 ≥ (pt ∧ pv)(qt ∨ qv) = pt(qt ∨ qv) > ptqt = 1,
a contradiction. The strict inequality follows from the fact that qv,1 > qt,1.
Case II: pt,1
pt,2
≤ pv,1
pv,2
, 1 ≥ pvqt and qt,2 > qv,2.
Again the premises implies that either pt,1 ≤ pv,1 or pt,2 ≥ pv,2.
If pv,1 > pt,1, then by the second condition, we have that qv,2 ≥ qt,2, a contradiction.
As such, it must be that pv,1 ≤ pv,2.
If pv,1 = pt,1, then by assumption, it must be that pv,2 6= pt,2. If pv,2 > pt,2, then
1 ≥ pvqt > ptqt = 1,
a contradiction.
If pv,2 < pt,2, we have that pt ∧ pv = pv, but then
1 ≥ (pt ∧ pv)(qt ∨ qv) = pv(qt ∨ qv) > pvqv = 1,
a contradiction. The strict inequality follows from the fact that qv,1 > qt,1.
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